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NATURE OF BRIEF 
This brief is a Reply Brief conforming to the requirements of Utah R.App.l' .'4ft j 
This Rule requires dial this hc\)i\ huri urnum) OMP, A I.I"K' of contents, a tabic of 
• Hilhonlies, an argument, and a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
REPLY TO PRELIMINARY M A T T E R S 
Appeliitii' I ii i Aiiniw) lisialrs Homeowners Association (hereafter "Homeowners") 
feels the need to biiefly reply to preliminary matters raised in Appellee Foothi r 
Company^ (hereaftt • • • • • * aers, in its initial brief in this 
matter, stated in paragraph 4 on page 3 that". . . The only parties against whom title was 
not quieted in this case were Foothills and Gerald 11 IUgley ami Bdglr v & I 'ompany." The 
i - ••*' itled "Statement of the Case," alleges that "Any order quieting 
:..IL in this action wJbich purports iu extinguish interests under the \vc)) J r ^ " jgjttvmmt 
cannot bind individual utnttbt'is ni llic I)»111Mt' Lmuly who were persons with a known 
interest in the well lease agreement, but were not named or served in this action." (Foothills 
Bi p. 2). . ' ..- , .  , 
recited in the Statement of Facts in Homeowners' opening brief: 
All unknown persons claiming an interest in Hi-Country Estates 
Subdivision were served pursuant to an Order authorizing 
service of summons by publication entered on March 23, 1987, 
by the Honorable David B. Dee (R 312, 313). Proof of 
publication was presented to the Court on or about May 1,1987 
(R. 340). Therefore, the only parties against whom title was 
not quieted in this case were Foothills and Gerald H. Barley 
and Bagley & Company. 
Homeowners' opening brief p 3, 
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Since the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals ruling that Gerald H. Bagley and Bagley 
& Company had no interest in the water system in question, and were not entitled to 
damages of any kind as a result of their association with the water system, and since Gerald 
H. Bagley and Bagley & Company failed to petition the Utah Supreme Court for certiorari, 
their interests have been extinguished as well. See U,CA. § 78-40-12 (1953). Foothills 
Water Company was the successor in interest to Bagley & Company and Gerald H. Bagley 
with regard to the 1977 Well Lease Agreement (R. 576-577, 647). In his Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law dated October 31, 1990, the trial judge found that Defendants 
Gerald PL Bagley and Bagley & Company had transferred all claims, rights, title and interest 
in the water system and water right to Defendant to J. Rodney Dansie by agreement of 
October 31, 1985, and that all such claims, rights, title, and interest in said water system and 
water right merged with those of Defendant J. Rodney Dansie and Defendant Foothills 
Water Company as of that date. See Add. 5 at p. 4 C. of L. of Appellant's first round 
opening Brief in this matter (as opposed to this second round of briefing on remand from 
the Supreme Court). 
Furthermore, at the time Homeowners filed their lawsuit on March 8, 1985, and 
subsequently, Homeowners were unaware, and remain unaware to this day, of what persons 
or entities might be claiming to be the successor of Jesse H. Dansie, with regard to the Well 
Lease and Water Line Extension Agreement. Homeowners had every reason to believe that 
J. Rodney Dansie was the successor to his father Jesse H. Dansie's interest in the Well 
Lease and Water Line Extension Agreement, and this Court upheld the trial judge's initial 
decision to quiet title to the water system and water right in Homeowners as against all 
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parties to the action. It is significant that Defendant J. Rodney Dansie did not appeal from 
any of the Court's Orders in this case (R. 1947-48). That being the case, and J. Rodney 
Dansie having been personally sued in this action, the interest of J. Rodney Dansie has thus 
been extinguished by the Quiet Title Order issued by Judge Brian after remand from the 
Court of Appeals on February 11,1994. This understanding of J. Rodney Dansie's interest 
in succeeding his father Jesse H. Dansie with regard to the 1977 Well Lease Agreement is 
supported by the Responsive brief filed in this instant appeal by Appellee Foothills Water 
Company. In a footnote on page 15 of its responsive brief, Foothills states "In April of 
1987, Foothills and Dansie agreed to continue the Well Lease on a month-to-month basis, 
and continued that arrangement until March of 1993." Although much more will be said 
about this particular statement infra in this brief, Jesse H. Dansie, the original party to the 
Well Lease Agreement, died on March 8, 1987 {see Addendum 1), and, therefore, the only 
other Dansie involved in this lawsuit is J. Rodney Dansie and must be the "Dansie" that is 
referred to in Foothills' initial brief in the instant matter. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that Homeowners was having trouble determining who 
may claim an interest in the water system, Homeowners chose to sue "unknown persons 
claiming an interest in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision." These unknown persons were 
served pursuant to an Order Authorizing Service of Summons by Publication entered on 
March 23, 1987, by the Honorable David B. Dee (R. 313, 313). Proof of Publication was 
presented to the Court on or about May 1, 1987 (R. 340). Thus, the Court's Quiet Title 
Order in favor of Homeowners extinguished the claims of any and all persons not directly 
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involved in the lawsuit who had an opportunity to present their interest in this lawsuit, but 
failed to do so. See U.CA. § 78-40-12 (1953) and U.R.C.P. 4. 
Therefore, it is indeed true that the only party to whom title has not been quieted 
in this case is Foothills Water Company. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION ALLOWS THIS COURT 
TO REVERSE THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DETERMINATION AS 
TO THE VALUE OF THE WATER SYSTEM ON GROUNDS 
OTHER THAN THOSE FOUND IMPERMISSIBLE BY THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Foothills argues in its responsive brief that the Utah Supreme Court's opinion 
compels affirmance of the district court's ruling. However, Foothills is incorrect when it 
alleges that the Supreme Court's opinion "compels affirmance of the district court's ruling." 
In its opinion (found at Add. 3 to Homeowners' opening brief), the Utah Supreme Court 
simply ruled ". . . The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's denial of the 
Homeowners Association's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the amount of 
reimbursement owed to the water company and in ordering the district court to defer to the 
PSC" 901 P.2d 1017 at 1022. The Court went lo great lengths to point out that the Public 
Service Commission did not have the power and authority to determine fair market value 
of the water system for all purposes, but only for rate-making purposes. Id. 
Thus, a reading of the Supreme Court's opinion clearly shows that that Court did not 
consider the additional issues raised by Homeowners before this Court in the initial first 
round appeal. Those additional issues were: Homeowners should not have been required 
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to pay for the water right; Homeowners have already paid for the water system and should 
not be required to pay a second time; and the water system in this case has little value to 
anyone but Appellant, but at any rate is worth no more than $27,650.00. 
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court's Order granting certiorari specifically stated 'The 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted only as to the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission." (See Add. 2 to Appellant's opening brief). The only conclusion that can be 
reached is that the Supreme Court's ruling stands for the proposition that this Court cannot 
base a reversal of the trial court's decision to order Homeowners to pay $98,500.00 for the 
water right and water system upon any decision made by the Public Service Commission. 
Therefore, the statement of Foothills in its responsive brief in the instant matter that "The 
Utah Supreme Court rejected the arguments advanced by Homeowners for reversal of the 
issues remaining in this case and remanded the case to this Court to complete the appeals 
process" is false and misleading. The only argument advanced by Homeowners which was 
considered by the Utah Supreme Court was the argument relating to the Public Service 
Commission. It is the province of this Court to determine whether or not the decision of 
the trial judge should be reversed on other grounds presented to this Court in the initial 
appeal, but not presented to the Supreme Court due to the restrictions created in the grant 
of certiorari. 
Finally on this point, Homeowners would have this Court note that the Utah 
Supreme Court has the power to remand any case it reviews on certiorari directly back to 
the trial court for judgment or proceedings consistent with its opinion. See, e.g. Crookston 
v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); U.R.C.P. 30. The fact that the Utah 
5 
Supreme Court chose to remand this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals is clearly a basis 
for concluding that it was the intent of the Court to have the Court of Appeals entertain 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Such further proceedings would include a 
determination by this Court that the prior basis it used for reversing the trial judge's 
decision to require Homeowners to pay $98,500.00 for the water right and water system was 
erroneous; but would also include this Court's further review of other bases originally 
presented by Homeowners in its first appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals for reversing the 
trial judge's determination. 
The reasoning presented above also applies to the issue of whether or not this Court 
has the right to determine that the Well Lease was a valid and binding encumbrance on the 
water system. Foothills states in its responsive brief that ". . . The Utah Supreme Court 
pointed out that the district court ruled that the Well Lease was a valid and binding 
encumbrance on the water system not withstanding the PSC's order." Homeowners would 
say "so what?". The Supreme Court was merely stating the district court's ruling. 
Fortunately, Foothills is honest enough to admit that the Utah Supreme Court "did not 
expressly mandate affirmance of the district court's ruling." However, Foothills goes on to 
claim that the Supreme Court's decision invalidates Homeowners' additional arguments for 
reversal and compels affirmance of the trial judge's decision. Such a statement by Foothills 
is a non sequitur. As stated above, the only thing the Supreme Court did was remand the 
case to this Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Therefore, as with the 
valuation issue, this Court is compelled only to conclude that the Public Service Commis-
sion's determinations regarding the Well Lease Agreement cannot be a basis for invalidating 
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the Agreement. It clearly leaves open, however, the issue of whether or not this Court 
should reverse the trial judge on other grounds raised by Homeowners in their original 
appeal to this Court. Homeowners ask this Court to reject the conclusion that this Court 
has no power to do anything but affirm the district court's ruling based upon the Supreme 
Court's opinion. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURTS DETERMINATION REGARDING 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE WATER SYSTEM AND 
WATER RIGHT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
In its responsive brief, Foothills argues that Homeowners have failed to show that 
the decision of the district court in setting the amount of value for the water system and 
water right at $98,500.00 is clearly erroneous. Foothills goes on to talk about the various 
experts that were called at the trial of this case, and that the range of opinion of those 
experts was from some $600,000.00 to zero. 
Foothills fails to address Homeowners' argument that it should not have been 
required to pay for the water right. Homeowners argued on page 13 in its brief filed in the 
first round of this case, and reiterated in Addendum 5 of its initial brief in the instant 
appeal, that the trial court had originally indicated Homeowners would be required to 
reimburse Foothills for improvements by Foothills to the water system for the years 1974 
to 1985 (R. 896). Nevertheless, at the valuation portion of the trial, the court expanded its 
inquiry, without expressly overruling its original decision, and allowed and required the 
parties to present evidence regarding the value of the water right in question, Application 
No. 33130 (59-1608) also referred to as the "Glazier Well Water Right." This was true, 
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despite the Court's having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated October 20,1989 (R. 899-904; Homeowners first round brief Add. 4) in which it ruled 
that Homeowners had previously obtained the right, title, and interest in the disputed water 
right due to an Assignment from Hi-Country Estates, Inc. to Homeowners and an 
acknowledgement by the State Engineer's Division of Water Rights that the Homeowners 
were the owner of the water right referred to as the Glazier Well Water Right. 
Foothills does not say one single word about this inconsistency in the trial court's 
ruling in its brief in the instant matter, but simply ignores it altogether. It is the position 
of Homeowners that if it was found to be the owner of the water right based upon historical 
assignments and acknowledgements by appropriate entities and authority, it should not be 
required to pay anything for the water right in question. Even if this Court were to 
determine that the trial court was correct in finding that Homeowners would be unjustly 
enriched by virtue of the improvements made in the water system itself by Foothills while 
Foothills was unlawfully in control of Homeowners' water system, that same reasoning 
cannot apply to the water right itself. Foothills did not present any evidence in the lower 
court, and has not advanced any arguments before this Court as to how Homeowners have 
been unjustly enriched as a result of Foothills' actions with regard to the water right itself. 
At the very least then, this Court should remand the case to the trial court for a 
determination of what portion of the $98,500.00 the Court intended to assign as unjust 
enrichment with regard to the water right itself. We know that the Court assigned some 
portion of the $98,500.00 as value for the water right because the Court entered a finding 
of fact in its October 31, 1990, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
9. The Homeowners Association will be unjustly enriched 
unless they reimburse Foothills Water Company as successor-in-
interest to Bagley & Company for the fair amount of the entire 
water system, the improvements made thereon from 1974 to 
1985 and the water right. 
R. 1623; Add. 5 p. 4, Homeowners' opening brief in the first round (emphasis supplied). 
Furthermore, Homeowners pointed out that in its Conclusions of Law of the same 
date, the trial court ruled: 
2. The Homeowners Association must pay Foothills Water 
Company the total sum of $98,500.00 for the value of the water 
system and water right. 
R. 1624; Add. 5 p. 5, Homeowners' opening brief in the first round (emphasis supplied). 
As pointed out previously, in the Court's final "Order Regarding Amount Payable by 
Plaintiff for the Subject Water System" issued October 31, 1990, the Court ruled: 
The Plaintiff is entitled to an Order Quieting Title to the water 
system within the boundaries of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision 
Phase I, and the water right represented bv Application No. 
33130 (59-1608) on file with Utah State Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of Water Rights and the Utah State 
Engineer's Office, upon payment of the sum of $98,500.00 to 
Foothills Water Company . . . 
R. 1627; Add. 6 p. 2, Homeowners opening brief in the first round (emphasis supplied). 
It is unfair and unjust that Homeowners should be found to have owned the water 
right and yet be required to pay Foothills in order to obtain a quiet title order to said water 
right. Foothills has never advanced an argument as to how Homeowners have been unjustly 
enriched with regard to this water right. Homeowners acknowledge that Foothills at least 
made an effort in the lower court to show the amounts expended for improvements on the 
water system itself, but no evidence was ever introduced in the lower court as to how 
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Homeowners had been unjustly enriched with regard to this water right that they were found 
to have owned since 1985. See Assignment of Application of Water Right 33130 (59-1608) 
from Hi-Country Estates, Inc. to Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, Add. 7 
Homeowners opening brief in the first round. 
Homeowners would also ask the Court to consider carefully the evidence that it 
presented in the lower court with regard to the value of improvements to the water system 
which the trial judge felt created an unjust enrichment type situation. This Court needs to 
understand first and foremost that the trial judge found as a matter of fact and concluded 
as a matter of law that Plaintiff was the legal owner of the disputed water system, which 
includes the water rights, the water lots, the water tanks, and the water lines. In its 
Conclusions of Law dated October 20, 1989, the Court ruled: "Plaintiff is the legal owner 
of the disputed water system, which includes the water right, the water lots, the water tanks, 
and the water lines (R. 899-904; Add. 4, Homeowners opening brief in the first round). 
Having so concluded, the trial judge's inquiry regarding what amount should be paid 
by Homeowners to Foothills should have focused on improvements to the water system 
made prior to the time that the Homeowners obtained title to the water system. Indeed, 
this was the initial conclusion of law of the Court on this issue in that same document of 
October 20, 1989, where the Court stated in Conclusion of Law No. 7: 
Defendants Foothills Water Company and/or Bagley & Com-
pany, by virtue of several legal and equitable principals are 
entitled to reasonable reimbursement for improvements made 
by them to Plaintiffs' water system from 1974 to 1985. 
R. 904; Add. 4, Homeowners opening brief in the first round. 
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Perhaps this Court can now see why it is so significant that when the trial judge 
decided to determine the value of the water system without overruling this prior order at 
the valuation portion of the trial held on July 30, 31 and August 1,1990, the lower court had 
significantly expanded its inquiry to include a determination of the general value of the 
water system. In doing so, the Court went beyond the concept of unjust enrichment based 
upon improvements to the water system and now created a circumstance where it was 
requiring Homeowners to pay once again for a water system and water right the Court had 
determined it already owned. This is why it was clearly erroneous for the Court to have 
based its decision on the amount to be paid by Homeowners for this water system on 
anything other than the value of the improvements themselves. 
Homeowners presented the testimony of Jon Strawn, former Chief Rate Engineer for 
the Division of Public Utilities, who testified that Foothills' operation of the water system 
(which actually belonged to Homeowners according to the trial judge's ruling) had shown 
a substantial loss every year between 1985, when it first began operating the water system, 
and the time of his testimony (1990). Furthermore, Mr. Strawn went on to state that as a 
result of the significant losses in the water system, it had no value to anyone other than the 
people who were served by the water system itself. These were the homeowners of Hi-
Country Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiffs and Appellants in this matter (R. 2047, 
2055, 2057). Mr. Strawn went on further to testify that his opinion of the value of 
improvements between 1974 and the time of his testimony (1990) was $13,376.69 (R. 2052). 
However, Mr. Strawn further testified that it would cost a new owner $160,300.00 to bring 
this antiquated water system up to appropriate standards (R. 2053, 2055). 
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Apparently, the trial judge totally disregarded the opinion of Mr. Strawn, who was 
the only witness that specifically testified regarding improvements to the water system 
between 1974 and 1990. Two expert witnesses called by Foothills in the trial, Stanley S. 
Postma and Seth Schick, testified as to their opinion of the value of the water system and 
water right as a whole. They gave no opinion as to the value of improvements with regard 
to the water system between 1974 and 1985, or 1990. 
Therefore, it is the position of Homeowners that the decision of the trial judge in 
reaching the conclusion that Homeowners would be unjustly enriched to the tune of 
$98,500.00 if they were to be awarded the water system was clearly erroneous. The trial 
judge should have based his decision on the opinion of Mr. Jon Strawn, who had testified 
that he had worked with the water system continuously as Chief Rate Engineer for the 
Division of Public Utilities between 1985 and 1990. Mr. Strawn testified that he had 
personally gone out and reviewed the water system on numerous occasions during that five-
year period in his official capacity, and was intimately familiar with it (R. 1995-1999). 
In its brief in the instant appeal, Foothills totally disregards Homeowners' argument 
in its opening brief regarding the importance of the testimony of Jon Strawn. 
Homeowners also argued in its opening brief in the instant matter, as well as in the 
first round, that they had already paid for the water system and should not be required to 
pay a second time. Foothills gives this argument short shrift by simply concluding that there 
was no evidence cited by Homeowners to support or compel a conclusion that the 
developers ever intended or agreed that Homeowners would be given title or control of the 
water system. Yet in making this argument, Foothills would have had to completely 
overlook Homeowners' argument in its initial brief in the instant matter, and also its 
opening brief in the first round, that one of the original developers, Mr. Gerald H. Bagley, 
testified at a deposition on April 12, 1988, that it was his understanding he would recover 
his investment in the water system through the sale of the lots. He also testified that 
method of recovering the cost of the water system was consistent with other projects he had 
developed (R. 1650 pp. 29, 30). 
Homeowners also presented in the lower court the testimony of John Thomas, a real 
estate agent who had resided in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I for 19 years at the 
time of trial, and was originally employed by the other two developers of the Subdivision 
(along with Mr. Bagley), Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewton, as project manager for the 
development beginning in appropriately 1971 (R. 2087, 2088). Mr. Thomas testified further 
that he had been authorized by Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewton (who had bought out Mr. 
Bagley at the time and were responsible for the development of the Subdivision) to inform 
potential lot purchasers ".. . The property owners association was to own the water system, 
at the time that the developers turned it back or over to them, and activated the property 
owners association. . . " (R. 2090). Mr. Thomas further testified that the lots would have 
been worthless to a prospective purchaser without the water system (R. 2091). 
Homeowners also called other witnesses, including the former president of the 
Homeowners Association, to testify that in their opinions they had paid for the water system 
when they bought their lots, and that it had been represented to prospective purchasers that 
the water system would be turned over to the Homeowners Association. The testimony of 
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one of the other developers, Charles Lewton, was presented to the Court as part of a 
deposition Mr. Lewton originally provided. Mr. Lewton testified that the reason the 
Homeowners Association was created by the developers in the first place was so they could 
take over the "amenities" that would service all of the lot owners. He testified that the 
water system was one of the amenities (R. 1655 p. 39). 
Although original developer Gerald H. Bagley changed his testimony between the 
deposition and the trial with regard to his intent as to the water system, he was substantially 
impeached by the additional testimony presented by Homeowners, and by his prior 
deposition stating otherwise (R. 2239, 2240). 
Therefore, the conclusion must be reached by this Court that the trial judge's 
determination of the amount of $98,500.00 to be paid by Homeowners for purposes of 
unjust enrichment was clearly erroneous. This Court is asked to reverse the findings of the 
trial court with instructions that the trial court enter an order finding that Homeowners 
would not be unjustly enriched if it were not required to pay any monies to Foothills with 
regard to this water system. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL JUDGE'S 
DETERMINATION THAT THE 1977 WELL LEASE AGREE-
MENT IS A VALID AND BINDING PERPETUAL ENCUM-
BRANCE ON THE WATER SYSTEM. 
In its initial brief in this matter, Homeowners argued that although the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed this court's decision reversing the trial court in finding the 1977 
Well Lease Agreement was a valid encumbrance on the water system, it did so only on the 
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basis that this Court relied on the March 17, 1986, decision of the Public Service 
Commission as grounds for such invalidation. This Court should now proceed, Homeowners 
argued, to determine whether or not the 1977 Well Lease Agreement should be invalidated 
on other grounds argued originally by Homeowners in its first round briefs before this 
Court, which resulted in this Court's September 22,1993, opinion. Homeowners argued that 
this Court should invalidate the Well Lease Agreement not only on the equitable grounds 
that it was grossly unreasonable and showered virtually limitless benefits on Jesse Dansie 
and the members of his immediate family, but also because this agreement terminated on 
its face on April 10, 1987, and was never legally renewed. Homeowners argued that no 
extensions of the agreement were ever submitted as evidence to the Court, and therefore 
it could not be used as a valid basis for an eternal encumbrance upon the water system as 
essentially ruled by the trial judge in this case. 
Incredibly, Foothills responds in its brief by making the following statement in a 
footnote on page 15: "The Well Lease provides that the parties to the agreement could 
renew the Well Lease on terms to be agreed to by the parties. In April of 1987, Foothills 
and Dansie agreed to continue the Well Lease on a month-to-month basis, and continued 
that arrangement until March of 1993." Of course, Foothills makes no citation to the record 
for this proposition and Homeowners challenges its veracity entirely. Homeowners maintain 
that not one single shred of documentary evidence or otherwise was presented to the trial 
judge with regard to any extensions of this Well Lease Agreement! Homeowners challenge 
Foothills at oral argument of this matter, if such is allowed, to cite a single page of the 
record in which a document showing an extension of this Well Lease Agreement alleged to 
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have occurred in April of 1987, and apparently continuing until March of 1993, was ever 
presented to the trial court. Furthermore, since the trial of this case was concluded on July 
30, 31, and August 1, 1990, at the very least, any statement by Foothills in its brief that 
something has occurred since the date of trial is not part of the record and should be 
stricken by this Court. This statement is entirely inappropriate and should subject Foothills' 
and its attorneys to sanctions pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Even if some testimony had been elicited at trial from J. Rodney Dansie indicating 
the Well Lease Agreement had somehow been extended, such testimony should have been 
totally disregarded by the trial judge, and should be disregarded by this Court. This is true 
because the Well Lease Agreement itself specifically provides: "Bagley shall have the right 
to renew this Well Lease on terms to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie at the termination 
of this Lease on April 10, 1987." Foothills places great importance on the fact that Jesse 
H. Dansie, the original party who leased the well to Gerald H. Bagley and the developers 
of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I, had filed a "Notice of Interest in Real Property" 
regarding this Well Lease Agreement. More will be said about this Notice of Claim 
argument later, but it should be important to this Court to know that if Foothills is going 
to rely on the Notice of Claim argument for the fact that somehow this Well Lease 
Agreement should "run with the land" and the owners of the water system should be 
perpetually responsible to comply with this agreement, no statement or claim is made that 
these alleged extensions were filed with the appropriate County Recorder's Office. Since 
the 1977 Well Lease Agreement expired on its face by its own terms on April 10, 1987 (a 
fact not disputed by Foothills in its responsive brief), then any extension, to be valid, should 
have also been recorded with the County Recorder's Office. No evidence of such extension 
was ever presented to the lower court, nor has any motion to supplement the record been 
made in this Court to establish that such extensions had been recorded. 
Foothills and its attorneys know well that no such written extensions even exist, let 
alone have been recorded, and this is why they have not cited to the record regarding these 
alleged extensions, nor attempted to present any evidence to the lower court or this Court 
as to the recording of such alleged extensions. 
In addition, it is the apparent allegation of Foothills that "Foothills and Dansie" 
agreed to continue the Well Lease on a month-to-month basis. The Court should 
understand that, like the original agreement, this agreement was intended to benefit the 
Homeowners of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association who were being served by the 
water system Foothills Water Company was illegally operating. We say illegally because the 
trial judge found that Homeowners had owned that water system since at least 1985. 
Therefore, basic contract law suggests that Homeowners should have had an opportunity to 
be a party to the alleged extension of this agreement, which they did not have. No evidence 
was presented in the lower court whatsoever regarding this alleged extension of the 
agreement and this is how the Court should know that Homeowners were not a party to the 
agreement. 
Finally, the Court should note that although Foothills was the successor-in-interest 
of Bagley & Company, having taken over the water system from Bagley in approximately 
1985, there was no evidence presented to the lower court with regard to who the successor-
1 1 
in-interest to Jesse H. Dansie was. Jesse H. Dansie became deceased on March 8,1987, (see 
Addendum 1), over a month prior to the agreement's expiration on April 10, 1987; and so 
when Foothills states in its brief that "Foothills and Dansie" had agreed to continue the Well 
Lease in April of 1987, it is unclear as to which Dansie Foothills is referring to. If it was 
J. Rodney Dansie, he was president of Foothills Water Company by his own testimony in 
the lower court, and based upon several documents admitted in the case. See, e.g. R. 1052; 
Add. 2 p. 9 Homeowners opening brief in the first round. 
Therefore, it ought to be readily seen by this Court that Mr. Dansie, as owner and 
president of Foothills Water Company is alleged to have made an agreement in April of 
1987 with himself in what could not possibly have been an arms length transaction to 
continue this Well Lease Agreement on a month-to-month basis as claimed by Foothills in 
its brief on page 15. This claim by Foothills is absolutely outrageous! This Court should 
demand appropriate proof that a legally valid extension was presented to the trial court 
before it even considers upholding this perpetual encumbrance on the water system found 
by the trial judge to be owned by Homeowners. 
Foothills also makes the untenable argument that because Jesse H. Dansie filed a 
"Notice of Interest in Real Property" with the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, the 
terms of the Well Lease Agreement should be applied in perpetuity, for time and all 
eternity, to anyone who purchases property in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision and uses the 
water system there. This argument is ludicrous at best! Foothills seemis to be arguing that 
the fact that this Notice of Interest was recorded should somehow have given appropriate 
notice to all purchasers of lots in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision that the water system they 
were counting on to provide them water was encumbered by a perpetual encumbrance. 
Homeowners would present the clear fact that the purpose and effect of recording is to give 
rise to certain presumptions pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 57-4a-4 
(as amended 1989). However, it should be understood by the Court that the 1977 Well Lease 
and Water Line Extension Agreement in question was not itself recorded. All that was recorded 
was a "Notice of Interest in Real Property" which referred to the Well Lease Agreement. 
Therefore, Utah's Recording Act provides no presumptions for the Well Lease Agreement 
itself. 
Furthermore, Foothills seems to be arguing that the fact of recordation of this 
"Notice of Interest in Real Property" somehow amended the specific terms of the Lease 
Agreement itself which provided as follows: "4. Bagley shall have the right to renew this 
Well Lease on terms to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie at the termination of this Lease 
on April 10, 1987." If this Court can find no valid extension of this Well Lease Agreement 
by appropriate parties under appropriate circumstances, the mere fact that the "Notice of 
Interest in Real Property" was recorded in 1985 by Jesse H. Dansie is totally irrelevant to 
the Court's inquiry. This recorded Notice of Interest does nothing more than a Notice of 
Lis Pendens pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-40-2. The lis pendens simply gives 
parties notice of a lawsuit regarding real property. In and of itself, it conveys no interest 
and does not alter any terms of the lawsuit it gives notice of. Likewise, this "Notice of 
Interest in Real Property" does not alter the terms of the underlying agreement; and thus 
it cannot act as an extension of the contract provision which provides for expiration on April 
10, 1987. 
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In its "Order on Briefing" dated February 8, 1996, this Court specifically ruled that 
its original opinion holding that Appellant Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners Association 
holds legal title to the water right, lots, and system was unaffected by the opinion of the 
Utah Supreme Court on certiorari and, accordingly, has been affirmed. This being the case, 
the Court needs to view this 1977 Well Lease and Water Line Transportation Agreement 
from the standpoint of the parties involved in that agreement. Even if it is presumed that 
it was appropriate for Gerald H. Bagley to have entered into this agreement with Jesse H. 
Dansie to provide a benefit to the Homeowners and lot owners who own property within 
Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I, Mr. Bagley transferred whatever interest he had in 
that regard to J. Rodney Dansie and Foothills Water Company on October 31, 1985 (R. 
1623; Add. 5, p. 4, Homeowners opening brief in the first round). Since Homeowners must 
be presumed, as a result of the final decision of the trial court, affirmed by this Court on 
appeal, that it owned the water system by virtue of an assignment from Hi-Country Estates, 
Inc. to Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association dated June 28, 1985 (R. 1359, 1402), 
only Homeowners would have the authority to be an appropriate party to extend the Well 
Lease Agreement when it expired on April 10, 1987. Instead, what Foothills claims 
happened was that Foothills itself entered into that extension, even though this Court has 
now affirmed the ruling that Foothills was unlawfully in control of the water system at that 
time. Therefore, as legitimate successor to the original developer, Gerald H. Bagley, only 
the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association Phase I representatives would have had 
the authority to have extended that Well Lease Agreement. Since there is no evidence that 
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it did so, this Court must conclude the Well Lease Agreement terminated on April 10,1987, 
and no longer acts as an encumbrance on the water system. 
Furthermore, Homeowners ask the Court to consider that, at the very least, this was 
an unconscionable agreement since it purported to provide water in perpetuity, as long as 
the water system in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I exists, to the Dansie family. 
This is true despite the fact that Foothills itself concedes that the Homeowners no longer 
use water from the well which was the subject of this 1977 Well Lease Agreement. This can 
be determined from the statement of Foothills indicated previously on page 15 of their brief 
that the month-to-month tenancy allegedly agreed to and extended by "Foothills and Dansie" 
continued only until March of 1993. This was because of the fact that Homeowners drilled 
their own well and began pumping their own water at that time. This fact, in and of itself, 
makes the alleged contract extension unconscionable, not to mention the other reasons cited 
in this brief. The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have held in numerous cases that 
Utah courts will refuse to enforce any contract if it appears to be clearly unconscionable. 
See In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 
(Utah 1983); Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah App. 1988). Homeowners submit that this 
contract, or at least its alleged extension providing water in perpetuity to the Dansie family, 
is clearly unconscionable and simply should not be enforced by this Court. 
Finally, Homeowners reassert the fact that the decision of the trial judge in this case 
was inconsistent in that the trial judge found in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
dated October 31, 1990, in Finding of Fact No. 5 that the Well Lease and Water Line 
Extension Agreement, which is the subject of this lawsuit, "was and is a valid and fully 
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binding encumbrance on the subject water system." Despite tin's statement, the Court goes 
on to state within this same Finding of Fact No. 5: "That encumbrance does not in any way 
legally burden the water system or the owner or operator of the water system." Homeown-
ers have continually argued that this Finding of Fact is internally inconsistent. How can the 
Court find that an agreement is a valid and fully binding encumbrance on the water system 
and yet in the same breath state that such encumbrance does not in any way legally burden 
the water system or the owner or operator of the water system? Judge Brian has created 
a non sequitur. It is simply not logical for the Court to have concluded that Homeowners 
must obey the terms of an agreement they were not even a party to, and yet the 
requirement to obey those terms is not a legal burden on the water system. 
CONCLUSION 
Homeowners respectfully request that the Utah Court of Appeals find and conclude 
that they should not have been required to pay the sum of $98,500.00 for their water system 
on grounds other than the determination of the Public Service Commission found to be 
impermissible by the Utah Supreme Court. Furthermore, Homeowners respectfully request 
that this Court completely invalidate the 1977 Well Lease and Water Line Extension 
Agreement which the trial judge found to be a perpetual encumbrance on the water system 
on equitable and legal grounds as indicated herein. Fundamental fairness requires a finding 
by this Court that that agreement is invalid, and it is respectfully requested that this Court 
enter such an Order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^f day of August, 1996. 
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